债务和魔鬼

• Grace

  2018-01-09
  解决第一个问题必须进行政策改革，且内容不应局限于金融体系的局部改良。这要求工资水平增长速度应快于名义GDP，随着中国的年轻成年人口数量下降，劳动力市场紧缩，这将成为自然趋势。还应减少家庭部门储蓄，但这一改变的前提条件是政府改善社会保障和医疗体系，减少预防性储蓄需求。 至于债务问题：1. “一切交给市场”，超出能力范围的违约，可能导致政府不愿看到的经济下行；2. “让信贷激增继续”，肯能延误时机，为未来埋下更大的金融隐患；3. 公开对部分债务惊喜社会化，中央政府发债为这些救助提供融资。
• Grace

  2018-01-09
  脆弱性主要体现在两方面：1. 重工业过度投资；2.房地产和基础设施建设竞相推进城市化进程。
• Grace

  2018-01-09
  私人信贷创造相对于政府法定货币创造的一个优势在于使信贷配置决策去政治化，避免新创造的购买哦最终配置到浪费钱的领域。
• Grace

  2018-01-02
  金融不稳定的核心在于银行创造新信贷、货币和购买力的无限能力与不可再生的城市土地供给短缺之间的相互作用。
• Grace

  2018-01-01
  但是现在，信贷被用于购买现存资产，货币大量流入资本市场导致资产价格上升，而资产价格上升又导致对信贷、货币需求的进一步上升，银行提供更多的信贷，创造更多的货币，资产价格进一步上升。尽管资产泡沫在膨胀，但由于银行信贷所创造的部分货币一直停留在资本市场，并未流入实体经济，所以通货膨胀不会因为信贷和货币的增长而相应上升。信贷密集度的提高，放映了两个现实：实体经济中是投资效率下降，虚拟经济中是金融的中介效率下降。前者意味着创造一个单位的GDP需要更多的实际投资；后者意味着为把一个单位的实际资源由配置到投资者，需要银行发放更多信贷。
• Grace

  2018-01-01
  金融活动存在的唯一理由是改善资源配置
• Kevin Lee

  2020-08-03
  Achieving that shift is essential. For if China continued to grow in its recent credit- intensive fashion, its debt stock would become daunting, not only in relation to China but also with respect to the whole world. By the early 2020s, China could have a nominal GDP of $20 trillion. If by then it had a nongovernment debt to GDP of 250% that would be $50 trillion of debt, 3.5 times the size of the U.S. mortgage markets which played such a major role in the origins of the 2007– 2008 financial crisis. And while China’s debt mountain is today owed almost entirely within China— and largely by banks, companies, and local governments all ultimately controlled or owned by the state— the more that China progresses toward a more normal market economy and the more that it liberalizes its capital acc...
• Kevin Lee

  2020-08-03
  As for the problem of existing debt, China faces a difficult choice between three risky policies. It could “let the market work” as companies and local governments deleverage where they can and default where they cannot. But that could produce a bigger economic downturn than the authorities are willing to accept. The second would be to “let the credit boom run,” with yet more credit extended to highly indebted companies and local governments. But that route would delay the desirable transition to a less investment focused economy and build up to bigger financial problems for the future. The third choice would be explicitly to socialize some of the debt— writing off bad loans in the banking sector and bailing out banks, state-owned companies, and overextended local governments— financ...
• Kevin Lee

  2020-08-03
  China, although still a lower-middle-income country, has thus become exposed both to the dangers of the directed credit model (excessive investment in heavy industry) and of a liberalized banking system (excessive investment in real estate).
• Kevin Lee

  2020-08-03
  The second vulnerability lies in real estate and infrastructure investment, where huge investments have been financed by second- and third-tier as well as leading cities— in airports, roads and railways, apartment blocks, industrial parks, convention centers, sports stadiums, and museums— in a competitive rush to urbanize. Much of this investment may be valuable, but much will prove to have been wasted. And the financing model used could not have been better designed to hardwire and turbocharge the credit and real estate cycle. Local governments borrow money to fund urban infrastructure projects in the hope that economic development will drive land price increases, enabling them to raise money from land sales to repay loans. The very structure increases the dangers of self- reinforcing cre...
• Kevin Lee

  2020-08-03
  As a result, China faces two different vulnerabilities. One lies in heavy industry sectors, with state-owned enterprises in steel, coal, cement, and other capital- intensive industries now facing credit financed overcapacity, in a classic example of the sort of overinvestment cycle described by both Friedrich Hayek and Hyman Minsky.
• Kevin Lee

  2020-08-03
  The particular nature of the vulnerabilities reflects the hybrid nature of the Chinese economy. In part, it is a market economy with intense competition among companies, but it is also one dominated by state-owned companies enjoying privileged relationships with state-owned banks. It is to a degree state-controlled but is also decentralized, with significant autonomy enjoyed by local provincial and city governments, who pursue economic development in competition with one another. Like Japan and Korea, China is industrializing, but government policyobjectives also define “urbanization” as an objective in itself; this was not the case for the earlier catch-up countries, where urbanization was seen simply as the likely result of industrialization. Credit meanwhileis not allocated by an enti...
• Kevin Lee

  2020-08-03
  The root causeof this investment spurt was the global financial crisis. The advancedeconomies contracted: export demand for Chinese goods fell precipitately,and employment fell. Concerned about the potential social andpolitical consequences, the Chinese government sought a rapid economicstimulus, and the easiest and most direct way to stimulate was bymeans of a massive boost to investment.
• Grace

  2018-01-08
  实际新增投资需求相对于合意储蓄的缺口越大，私人信贷体系越有动力为竞相购买不可再生资产的投机性活动提供融资，并辅以复杂而危险的金融工程技术。
• Grace

  2018-01-08
  实际利率过低是导致危机的根本原因之一。低利率鼓励住房所有者和投资者借入资金购买房产或扩大消费，同时激发人们追逐收益率，进而推动了金融创新和金融体系内部的交易活动。实际收益率为什么会显著下降？1. 理论上看，合意储蓄相对于事前合意投资出现了上升，要么是合意储蓄增加，要么是因为合意投资下降。
• Grace

  2018-01-08
  名义经济增加的三种相互独立的方式：1.增加金属货币；2. 政府的法定货币创造；3. 私人的信贷及货币创造。
• Grace

  2018-01-04
  1. 人类决策并非完全理性；2.非理性的影响不是独立和随机的，而是高度相关的；3. 单支股票或者债券可以被拉回理性价格，但是整个市场都出现偏差的时候，无计可施。4. 个人的理性可能导致集体的不稳定，理性的个体会推测其他人的选择。5.
• Grace

  2018-01-04
  三个观点：1. 总体上人是理性的；2.即使部分人不理性，他们的不理性也是随机的，许多人不可能不理性地购买，但同时也人可能不理性地出售，他们的行为可以被忽略；3.即使有足够多的不理性者使价格偏离有效率的理性价值，理性套利者也会发现这种偏离，并从回归有效理性的交易中获利。
• Grace

  2018-01-06
  证券化信贷的时机情况于理想状态相距甚远，主要包括四方面：1. 虽然信贷风险表明上转出银行资产负债表，但实际上并没有转向真正的最终投资者，而是由自身或其他银行的交易账户持有；2. 即使信贷风险确实转出银行资产负债表，期限转换风险却并未从银行体系中消除；3. 挫伤了信贷分析的积极性，因为只需要考虑证券出售给下家之前的市场情绪与价格将如何变化；4. 衍生品不仅能对冲风险，同时也极大地产生了新的风险。先进的风险管理手段的信心理念包括四个方面：1. 市场参与者可以观察风险的市场价格，并从中获取与风险相关的有效信息；2. 如果能已盯市方式持续测算风险敞口和盈利情况，金融机构就能够更好地管理风险；3. 抵押品、估值折扣和追加保证金能够为金融合约提供担保，有效控制风险，以确保即使交易对手违约，索偿的抵押品价值也足以覆盖风险敞口。4。风险价值模型能准确估测任何给定头寸组合的风险程度以及用于吸收风险的缓冲资本规模，而不论是金融合约层面的估值折扣，还是整个金融机构层面的资本。
• Grace

  2018-01-06
  1. 误导忽视风险；2. 可能面临新增信贷供给的“突然终止”；3。当债务不可持续时.，无法进行相应的平滑调整（必须破产？？）；4.信心下降和信贷收缩导致资产价格下降会进一步削弱信心；5.资产价格下降造成债务积压和通货紧缩风险。