黑格尔的观念论

• 浅中

  2021-03-16
  Indeed, throughout the Logic, this dependence has been continually apparent. Although Hegel sometimes writes as if dialectical development in the Logic proceeds by showing that "in thinking" one Notion one would really be "thinking its other," we have found that this does not reflect his actual procedure. In trying to understand why the thought of "being as nothing" was a problem, and why Hegel would think that such a problem could be sublated by the thought of becoming, or why the thought of becoming required the determinations of Dasein, we found that we had to refer to what would be an adequate, pure Notional determination of objects. The same was true of such issues as the insufficiency of a qualitatively finite Notion of objects. It is certainly possible, that is, that the world can b...
• 浅中

  2021-03-16
  Now, to make final use of the evidence accumulated over the last two chapters, I think that the best way to understand what Hegel is getting at with his "dialectical" Notion of otherness is to see it in the context illuminated by the Kantian framework. That is, to put the point negatively first, if the Logic were to be understood as an extended analysis of the conceptual presuppositions of the Notion of a self-conscious, judging subject, it would be unclear from that "analysis" alone, whether such results had to do with anything other than the Notion of a self-conscious subject. Nothing whatsoever about objects would follow from such analysis. However, Hegel assumes that he has already, prior to the start of the Logic, justified the general claim that no consideration of the determinations...
• 浅中

  2021-03-16
  But the method is no less synthetic, since its subject matter, determined immediately as a simple universal, by virtue of the determinateness which it possesses in its very immediacy and universality, exhibits itself as an other [als ein Anderes sich zeigt]. (WL, II, 491; SI, 830; my emphasis)
• 浅中

  2021-03-16
  The method of absolute cognition is to this extent analytic. That it finds the further determination of its initial determination simply and solely in the universal, is the absolute objectivity of the Notion, of which objectivity the method is the certainty. (WL, II, 491; SL, 830)
• 浅中

  2021-03-13
  But in external reflection there is also implicit the notion of absolute reflection; for the universal, the principle or rule and law to which it advances in its determining, counts as the essence of that immediate which forms the starting point; and the immediate therefore counts as a nullity, and it is only the return from it, its determining by reflection, that is the positing of the immediate in accordance with its true being. Therefore, what reflection does to the immediate, and the determinations which issue from reflection, are not anything external to the immediate but are its own proper being.
• 浅中

  2021-03-13
  In a way intended to be symmetrical to what occurred in positing reflection, just as there the attempt to determine a "negative" immediacy by a positing activity was shown to involve a "return" to a determinate presupposition from which reflection was oriented, so here the attempt to determine a particular externally involves a "return" to the particular in a way that connects the results of reflection to that particular, as its essence, and so sublates the presumed externality.
• 浅中

  2021-03-13
  When Hegel had claimed, then, that the immediacy of illusory being was spurious (because always already determinate) and thus introduced the immediacy of reflection itself, the independent self-determinations of autonomous thought, he was, we now find, only provisionally describing such activity. It is not a pure or immediate positing, because it is also a "presupposing," it always involves an orientation from a certain presupposed given insufficiency and toward a certain presupposed goal. The identification of illusory being with reflection thus has its dialectical counterpart: that the conceptual specifications of any possible manifold presuppose a specific kind of "conceptualizing" requirement, a notion of what specifically would be required if the otherwise uninformed, illusory being (...
• 浅中

  2021-03-13
  Thus, when Hegel had said that this kind of reflection was a "negative (1) of the negative (2) as negative (3)," he was claiming that the reflective, selfdetermined activity, as a negating of immediacy (1), overcomes the insufficiencies of the appearances as such, of Shine (2), but only as those appearances are already understood to be insufficient in a certain way, as negative (3). And this does not mean that Hegel is trying to argue that such reflective activity is, despite its own claims, still tied to some pretheoretical given, since it also turns out that what reflection here presupposes as some other is also, itself, a result of a "positing."
• 浅中

  2021-03-01
  To consider some Notional criterion, B,justifiable not in some absolute or realist sense, but because B improves on A, the best hitherto available option, can be taken in one of two ways. One way, by far the stronger, is to argue that, given the internal difficulties of A, B is the only possible resolution of those difficulties, and so represents a "necessary" correction of A. The weaker argument is that B does resolve the inadequacies of A in the appropriate way, and issues a challenge to any potential objector to provide a better resolution.
• 浅中

  2021-03-02
  Neither is the case, however. It does not seem that the fact that consciousness cannot express in words the determinate character of its object is itself proof that it cannot immediately intend such an object. Rather, the impossibility of a direct apprehension of a determinate object is shown to be a consequence of the restrictions inherent in such a putative experience, a consequence of the absence of any determining capacity, whether linguistic or not.
• 浅中

  2021-03-02
  All that sense certainty could experience would be such an indeterminate presence; that means that no determinate relation to an object has been established, and that means that the possibility of "experience" has not been established. The difficulty of expressing a sense-certain experience in language is the difficulty it is because a sense-certainty-defined experience is necessarily indeterminate. The reference to language, in other words, plays an explanatory, not a justificatory, role.
• 浅中

  2021-03-02
  It is not that language or some conceptually determined experience cannot "reach" a determinate object at all, but it cannot reach it if that reaching and that object are defined as sense certainty defines them.
• 浅中

  2021-03-02
  The experience I am "now" having can easily be imagined to be of a complex enough duration to make it ambiguous which aspect of "this now experience" I am referring to (ambiguous even to myself), and "the this" I point to is obviously spatially complex enough to raise any number of questions about the exact object of my intending, no matter how precise my language or specific my pointing.
• 浅中

  2021-03-02
  The "Now," and the pointing out the "Now," are thus so constituted that neither the one nor the other is something immediate and simple, but a movement which contains various movements.
• 浅中

  2021-03-02
  The claim is that an object must itself be capable of exhibiting a property complexity in experience in order for there to be the mediated taking-to-be-true necessary for any perceptual intending. Although it is logically possible that no object exhibits such complexity, ever, in any experience, to entertain that possibility would also be to claim that consciousness cannot ever relate itself to and distinguish itself from an object at all. And Hegel clearly believes that he has established that there is no good reason for taking such a possibility as a serious skeptical threat. To the extent that such a possibility could be conceived as an experience, Hegel has already shown its self-refuting difficulties.