选择、价值与决策

最新书摘:
  • 77
    2021-08-29
    正如上面所述,大多数人的直觉会使他们的行为遵循这些原则。也就是说如果你询问受试者:“谁会更开心,是得两场赌局,分别获得50美元和25美元奖金的那个人,还是赢得一场赌局,获得75美元的那个人?”64%的受试者回答那个赢得两场赌局的人会更开心。大多数人的直觉也符合其余三项原则。这些原则在思考市场营销时非常有用。换言之,如果一个人想要描述某件产品的优缺点时,为了最大限度地向消费者展示产品的吸引力,享乐型选择框架的原则会有所帮助。例如,把一个销售活动构建成“打折扣”而非临时降价,可能更便于按照原则4分割出收益。
  • 77
    2021-08-23
    以及不透明问题上出现的与随机占优不符合的情况,都很难通过激励化解。大筹码不总能改善决策的证据并不仅限于实验研究中,明显的判断和选择错误也在包含大筹码和严肃思考的现实决策中出现过。例如,小企业的高失败率很难用理性预期假设和风险规避加以解释。激励并不具有魔力:它们通过提高注意力和延长思考而发挥作用。因此,它们更可能阻止由于关注和努力不足而产生的错误,而不是防范来自错误认知或直觉的错误。视觉上的幻觉是一个富有教益的例子。没有明显的理论可以解释图12-2中观察到的仅仅引入激励(不增加测量的机会)就能减少幻觉,而当将这个图改变时(见图12-3),这种幻觉甚至在没有激励的情况下,居然消失了。激励的纠正力量依赖于特定错误的本质属性,而不能视为理所当然。对于决策制定的理性假设的维护,经常是引用人们会学习如何做出正确决定这个提法,有时会引用那个进化论点,即不理性的决策者将被理性决策者淘汰。毫无疑问,学习和选择确实在发生,而且会提高效率。正如激励一样,但是它们也没有那么大的魔力。有效学习只在确定条件下发生:它要求对实际状况与适当
  • 无关变量
    2021-08-15
    这类结果存在令人困扰的道德层面问题:不变性在规范意义上是不可缺直觉上是明显的,但从心理角度看难以行得通。我们只知道可以通过两种方证不变性:一是采用一种程序将问题的等效版本转换成同样的规范表征。让专业的学生遵循这个要求是合理的,他们应该从总资产而不是收益或损失角考每个决策问题( Schlaifer1959)。
  • 绿黎藤
    2021-05-19
    The concept of utility and value are commonly used in two distinct senses: (a) experience value, the degree of pleasure or pain, satisfaction or anguish in the actual experience of an outcome; and (b) decision value, the contribution of an anticipated outcome to the overall attractiveness or aversiveness of an option in a choice.
  • 绿黎藤
    2021-05-19
    In general, loss aversion favours stability.The instability of preferences produces a preference for stability.
  • 绿黎藤
    2021-05-19
    Thaler(1980] coined the term “endowment effect” to describe the reluctance of people to part from asserts that belong to their endowment,
  • 绿黎藤
    2021-05-19
    All analyses of rational choice incorporate two principles: dominance and invariance. Dominance demands that if prospect A is at least as good as prospect B in every respect and better than B in at least one respect, then A should be preferred to B.Invariance requires that he preference order between prospects should not depend on the manner in which they are described.
  • 绿黎藤
    2021-05-19
    In general, a preference for a sure outcome over a gamble that has higher or equal expectation is called risk aversion, and the rejection of a sure thing in favour of a gamble of lower or equal expectation is called risk seeking.
  • 绿黎藤
    2021-05-19
    The concept of utility and value are commonly used in two distinct senses: (a) experience value, the degree of pleasure or pain, satisfaction or anguish in the actual experience of an outcome; and (b) decision value, the contribution of an anticipated outcome to the overall attractiveness or aversiveness of an option in a choice.
  • 绿黎藤
    2021-05-19
    In general, loss aversion favours stability.The instability of preferences produces a preference for stability.
  • 绿黎藤
    2021-05-19
    Thaler(1980] coined the term “endowment effect” to describe the reluctance of people to part from asserts that belong to their endowment,
  • 绿黎藤
    2021-05-19
    All analyses of rational choice incorporate two principles: dominance and invariance. Dominance demands that if prospect A is at least as good as prospect B in every respect and better than B in at least one respect, then A should be preferred to B.Invariance requires that he preference order between prospects should not depend on the manner in which they are described.
  • 绿黎藤
    2021-05-19
    In general, a preference for a sure outcome over a gamble that has higher or equal expectation is called risk aversion, and the rejection of a sure thing in favour of a gamble of lower or equal expectation is called risk seeking.
  • 绿黎藤
    2021-05-19
    The study of decisions addresses both normative and descriptive questions. The normative analysis is concerned with the nature of rationality and the logic of decision making. The descriptive analysis, in contrast, is concerned with people’s beliefs and preferences a they are, not as they should be.
  • 绿黎藤
    2021-05-19
    The study of decisions addresses both normative and descriptive questions. The normative analysis is concerned with the nature of rationality and the logic of decision making. The descriptive analysis, in contrast, is concerned with people’s beliefs and preferences a they are, not as they should be.
  • ydanielCN
    2021-12-29
    我们将从风险选择和无风险选择的角度,讨论认知和心理方面的决定因素。从心理物理学角度看,价值使得收益区间出现风险规避,而损失区间出现风险寻求。对于风险而言,与有中等机会发生的事件相比,确定性事件和不可能事件发生的概率会被高估。与理性选择的不变性标准相比,策问题可以用不同方式描述或建构,因而会产生不同的偏好。在心理核算的过程中,人们会重新组织交易结果,解释消费者行为中出现的一些异常现象。尤其是对一个选项的接受程度,可能取決于将负面结果视为成本,还是将其视为无法获得补偿的损失。我们还将讨论決策效用和体验效用之间的关系。
  • 77
    2021-08-29
    采用和金钱可以被替代的同样逻辑(即一个账户的钱可以用到另一个账户),经济学家提出时间也应该可以被替代。一个理性的人应该最优化分配时间这意味着“边际相等”,此时多花在任一活动上的一分钟的边际价值都是相等的。夹克衫和计算器的例子揭示了这个法则不适合于时间方面的选择。受试者在购买一个小额物品时愿意花费20分钟以节省5美元,但在购买大额物品时却不这样做。勒克菜尔等人通过改变这个问题,扩展了这个说法。他们询问受试者,愿意支付多少钱以避免排队45分钟买票。他们发现,与购买15美元的票相比,人们在购买45美元的票时,愿意多支付一倍的价格以免排队等候。而在这个问题的原始版本中,我们看到人们为时间赋予的隐含价值取决于财务上的考虑