邓普顿教你逆向投资

最新书摘:
  • 目送飞鸿
    2024-06-04
    Uncle John devised a strategy to sell short technology shares 11 days or so before the lockup expired in anticipation of heavy selling by insiders once they were allowed to unload their shares on the public. He concentrated on technology issues whose values had increased three times over the initial offering price. He reasoned that stocks that had increased that much in value provided an extra incentive to insiders to cash out and sell their holdings. In sum, he found 84 stocks that met this criterion and decided to place a position of $2.2 million into each short sell.All told, he bet $185 million of his own money that tech stocks would plummet at the height of the bubble.
  • 目送飞鸿
    2024-06-04
    it was the spread of electricity, and it changed the world forever, but the time to get out of those stocks was many years before.
  • 目送飞鸿
    2024-06-02
    Just as Uncle John pointed out that investors who longed for the buying opportunity of 1932 totally missed out on the stock market of the early 1980s, it is important to adopt a mentality that you will examine stocks that others will not, whether an individual instance or an entire country’s market full of stocks. For some reason, even those who get the idea that when stocks are depressed it is the correct time to buy still resist doing so. It is an age-old phenomenon, and a perverse one at that, that when stocks go on sale, no one will buy them.
  • 目送飞鸿
    2024-06-02
    What we have to go back to, however, was his willingness to walk into a situation that had been deemed hopeless by all others, examine it with an open mind, and then have the conviction to follow through on his findings and go against the crowd. This practice of looking for bargains where others refuse to look and then having the strength to stand alone on an island is a basic recipe for sustained success in value investing.
  • 目送飞鸿
    2024-06-02
    Uncle John said that if corporate profits grew at their long-term average growth rate of about 7 percent and inflation remained at an expected run rate of around 6 to 7 percent, overall profits would increase approximately 14 percent a year. If those 14 percent gains compounded annually, the values of the stocks would nearly double over the next five years, and if that held up, they would double again in the next five. This corporate earning activity alone would not require the stock market to assign a higher P/E multiple in order to double. However, with the Dow’s P/E ratio at around 7× compared with the long-term average of 14×, it was reasonable to see the index getting a lift from a return to the average P/E ratio as well. Then, with all the money sitting on the sidelines and not being...
  • 目送飞鸿
    2024-06-02
    Using this logic, we can see that stock prices not only were low relative to the historical costs of assets but were much lower than the costs of actually replacing those assets. Uncle John said that in late 1982, stock prices relative to the replacement values of assets were at all-time historical lows.…To bring this relationship into better focus, if we look across the graph and search for another period in which the Dow Jones price/book ratio was below one, we must go all the way back to 1932. That year was the low point of the market crash that began in 1929, and the country was in the middle of the Great Depression. However, during the Depression the economy experienced falling prices, known as deflation, versus the rising prices of the late 1970s and early 1980s, known as inflation...
  • 目送飞鸿
    2024-06-02
    The presence of double-digit inflation altered the conventional nature of the price/book ratio and uncovered extra value for investors.For instance, because of double-digit inflation, Uncle John reasoned that although prices relative to book values were already enticingly low and therefore attractive to a bargain hunter, the ratio was not revealing the full picture of how discounted the stocks had become. He reasoned that the replacement value of assets was much higher than the historical costs of the assets listed on a company’s balance sheet.
  • 目送飞鸿
    2024-06-02
    Sometimes the best opportunities are in plain view, but when investors see other investors passing them by or deriding them, they too pass. Social proof is a powerful force, but work hard not to let it guide your investment decisions.
  • 目送飞鸿
    2024-06-02
    Uncle John often looked for stocks that were trading at no more than five times the current share price divided by his estimate of earnings five years into the future.
  • 目送飞鸿
    2024-05-27
    Volatility presents opportunities. The greater the volatility, the greater the opportunities to locate a bargain. If you are a purchaser of bargain stocks, volatility is your friend; if you are a purchaser of popular story stocks, volatility is your enemy.
  • timeseeker
    2017-07-27
    机会成本是经济和金融领域一个流行概念,表示我们采取一个行动的同时就放弃了采取另一行动所带来的可能利益。
  • timeseeker
    2017-07-26
    看一下股票价格除以每股销售额、每股收益或每股票面价值后所得的结果。如果计算出的这个数字比它竞争对手的数字或与之相关的股市指数高很多,那么这就很可能是过分受追捧的故事股。
  • Molly
    2011-08-23
    大多数分析师解决这个问题的方法是,如果某公司或其所在行业没有出现重大变化的话,就根据公司的历史平均收益做一个逆向预测。换句话说就是,如果过去10年的长期平均净利润率是5%,而公司去年的净利润率是7%,那么把5%看作是公司未来5年的一个收益标准于便宜货猎手而言是明智的;当然,除非该公司发生了将永久性地改变其盈利能力的事情,如果真的发生了这种事,那么7%就是未来收益的一个合理标准。保守一些的便宜货猎手预测的利润率可能会是5%,这只是为了以防万一,因为毕竟未来是难以预料的。
  • Molly
    2011-08-23
    约翰寻找股票的标准往往是,用当前每股价格除以他估计的未来5年的每股收益,然后得出一个数字,股票交易价格不能超过这个数字的5倍。同理,他还说过,根据他对来年每股收益的估计,他偶尔也能以仅仅1~2倍于那个数字的价格买下股票。当然,这种交易是在价值陷入低迷的极端情况下进行的。
  • Molly
    2011-08-21
    怎样才能识别并避免购买故事股?在这种情况下,记住,数字永远不会撒谎。看一下股票价值除以每股销售额、每股收益或每股票面价值后所得的结果。如果计算出的这个数字比它竞争对手的数字或与之相关的股市指数高很多,那么这就很可能是过分受追捧的股市股。尽管如此,也别完全相信我们的话。有一项在过去50年里一直持续进行的研究通过观察证实,购买那些股票对销售额比率偏高、价格对收益比率偏高或价格对票面价值比率偏高的股票,从长远来看是糟糕的投资。
  • penddy
    2011-02-15
    约翰选择了一只共同基金,把它作为自己在不景气的韩国股市投资的主要工具之一。这一策略对所有的便宜货猎手来说——无论他来自哪个行业,有什么样的背景——都极具启发意义。对真正的便宜货猎手来说,没有必要在每种情况下都深入挖掘买入个股,当所有人都对某个市场避之唯恐不及,而你却在这个极度悲观点进行投资的时候,尤其如此。
  • penddy
    2011-02-15
    在管理邓普顿基金的漫长岁月里,他总是拿着一份证券“愿望清单”,单子上的证券代表着那些他认为运作良好,但市场价格过高的公司。进一步说,如果由于某种原因出现的市场大抛售导致他愿望清单上的股票价格下跌至他认为便宜的水平,他就会给自己的经纪人下长期订单购买那些股票。
  • 目送飞鸿
    2024-05-09
    Bull markets are born on pessimism, grow on skepticism, mature on optimism, and die on euphoria. The time of maximum pessimism is the best time to buy, and the time of maximum optimism is the best time to sell.
  • 目送飞鸿
    2024-05-09
    To buy when others are despondently selling and to sell when others are avidly buying requires the greatest of fortitude and pays the greatest ultimate reward.
  • 一锅脑浆粥
    2016-02-23
    约翰总给我们讲他和他第一任妻子在婚后不久搬到纽约的事情。为了开创他的投资事业,他们当时约定把他俩收入的一半存起来。每进账1美元,其中50美分存起来,另外50美分拿去投资。为了保证这种高比例储蓄,他和妻子朱迪丝费尽心思想了各种办法。搬进他们在纽约的第一所不带家具的公寓后,他俩立刻开始在报纸上仔细搜索家具拍卖和房地产买卖的广告信息。到他们把带有五个房间的公寓全部配齐家具时,总共只花了25美元(供好奇的读者参考,这相当于2006年的大约351美元)。他们还发动朋友一起搜寻便宜货,甚至包括市内各处的特价套餐,目的就是只花5毛钱(相当于2006年的7.03美元)吃一顿饭。约翰和妻子就这样成了顶尖的便宜货猎手。他们的猎取行动与其说是购买便宜货的过程,倒不如说是搜索便宜货的过程。约翰最满意的交易直译是,只花5美元就买到了一张价值200美元的沙发床。由于当时的经济还未完全走出大萧条的阴影,他们因此得以利用了人们的破产和各种几乎没有出价者关注的拍卖会。几年之后,他们的长子杰克出生了,约翰和朱迪丝又把家搬到了新泽西州的恩格尔伍德镇。他们用5000美元现金买下了一所住宅,这所住宅5年以后被他们以17000美元高价卖掉了。为了满足你的好奇心,解释一下:这相当于在短短5年时间内,他们的复合收益率达到了28%。在不包括他的股票投资收益的情况下,这样的收入还算可观吧。在以上的种种投资中,约翰惯用的一个基本原则是:买任何东西都务必用现金支付,这样的话你就永远是利息的受益者,而不是利息的支付者。这条原则对他一生影响极为重大。他一生当中就从未借过抵押贷款,从不借钱买车,即使在经济不景气的时期,他也总是有充足的积蓄助他渡过难关。