主体性和自身性
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MoonyLee2024-05-13正如我们刚才所见的，纳托尔普主要提出了两大批评：1。现象学宣称它描述和分析活生生的主体性自身，并且为了做到这一点，它引入了一种反思的方法论。然而，反思是一种内知觉。它是一种包含了对象化过程的理论态度。正如纳托尔普随后所质问的，这一对象化的过程如何使我们达到活生生的主体性本身呢？2。现象学的目标在于描述那处在理论前的直接性之中的体验结构。每一种描述都必然涉及对语言、对概括及归类概念的使用。由于这一原因，每一种描述和表达都包含了一个中介的和对象化的过程，这将必然使我们远离了主体性本身。海德格尔如何看待纳托尔普对这一“反思的现象学”所作出的批评呢？在某种程度上，海德格尔似乎接受了它。问题在于体验的维度是否能够通过胡塞尔反思的方法论得到充分的探究，即通过反思性的描述和描述性的反思这一方法（Heidegger，GA56/57：100，GA59：194）。正如海德格尔所指出的那般，反思是一种理论性的姿态，且每一种理论的尝试、每一项观察和论证都含有一定程度的对象化变更，一种特定的“去活性（deiving）”因素，它引入了体验和被体验之物之间的某种断裂（Heidegger GA56/57：73一74，98）。这一变更在反思的情形优为鲜明，因为反思将一种非反思地被经历的体验转变为一个被观察的对象，换言之，当一个体验被反思地给予时，它就不再被经历而只是被注视了（Heidegger，GA56/57：100）。
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MoonyLee2024-05-13在纳托尔普看来，每一个表达（Ausserung）都是一种外在化（Entausserung）在意识表达其自身之时，它遗弃了自身的领地并且进入到了对象的疆域之中，我们便再次丢失了那使我们感兴趣之物（Natorp，1912，99）。
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安左2020-01-16Any experience that is that lacks self-awareness is non-conscious.
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安左2020-01-16As Sartre wrote: this self-consciousness we ought to consider not as a new consciousness, but as the only mode of existence which is possible for a consciousness of something.
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豆友589061322017-10-28Is it possible to specify the nature of this immediate self-givenness any further? Regrettably, Husserl was not forthcoming with details. The terminology used, and the fact that we are confronted with an occurrence by no means initiated, regulated, or controlled by the subject, suggests that we are dealing with a state of pure passivity, with a form of self-affection. This interpretation is confirmed by Husserl, for instance in his manuscript C 10 (1931), where he spoke of self-affection as an essential, pervasive, and necessary feature of the functioning ego. In manuscript C 16 (1931–33) he added that we are ceaselessly (unaufhörlich) affected by ourselves (see also Husserl Ms. C 10 3b, 5a, 7a, 9b–10a; C 16 82a; C 16 78a). Thus, along with the term Urbewußtsein, self-affection might be th...
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豆友10780532011-03-04Is there any alternative? The obvious way to dismantle the dilemma is to concede that we are aware of our own experiences in an immediate, prereflective, and nonobjectifying manner. If we are to avoid an infinite regress, this primitive, pre-reflective self-awareness cannot be a result of a secondary act or reflex, but must be a constitutive aspect of the experience itself. Prior to reflection, experiential states do present themselves, but not as objects. Metaphorically speaking, experiential states are characterized by a certain self-luminosity; they are self-intimating or self-presenting (see Shoemaker 1996, 51, 225). Thus, the first-personal givenness of experience should not be taken as the result of a higher-order representation, reflection, internal monitoring, or introspection, but...
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豆友10780532011-03-04It is relatively, but not completely, uncontroversial to concede that we, under certain circumstances, are aware of our own experiences as immanent objects, namely whenever we reflect. If I reflect on my occurrent perception of my laptop and reflectively try to discern and articulate the different structures of this perception, I do seem to be confronted with a rather peculiar immanent object. In the Bernau Manuscripts, Husserl called these objects of reflection “noetic objects” (Hua 33/449). The crucial question, however, is whether our experiences are also given as objects in inner time-consciousness prior to reflection. Is their primal givenness an objectmanifestation? This is what the internal object account claims; but is it true? Not only do I think it is wrong from a purely descript...
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豆友10780532011-03-04In Husserl’s recently published Bernauer Manuskripte über das Zeitbewusstsein (originally written in 1917–1918) one can find texts wherein he defended what might be called an internal object account, that is, he argued that inner time-consciousness makes us aware of the intentional experiences as immanent temporal objects. In text number six, for instance, which carries the title “Acts as objects in the ‘phenomenological time,’” Husserl argued that one should distinguish between the perception of a tone, on the one hand, and the original or inner consciousness in which the perception is constituted as a temporal unity on the other. Every perception is what Husserl called an act-object (Aktgegenständlichkeit). Every perception is itself something that is constituted as an object in original...
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豆友10780532011-03-04In his Vorlesungen zur Phänomenologie des inneren Zeitbewußtseins, Husserl asks how it is possible for us to be conscious of temporal objects. His well-known thesis is that a perception of a temporal object, as well as the perception of succession and change, would be impossible if consciousness provided us only with access to the pure now-phase of the object and if the stream of consciousness itself was a series of unconnected points of experiencing, like a line of pearls. Had our perception been restricted to being conscious of that which exists right now, it would have been impossible to perceive anything with temporal extension and duration, for a succession of isolated, punctual, conscious states does not, as such, enable us to experience succession and duration. Since we are obviousl...
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豆友10780532011-03-04If we follow Husserl a step further in his analysis, he distinguishes between receptivity and affectivity: Receptivity is taken to be the first, lowest, and most primitive level of intentional activity, and consists in responding to, or paying attention to, that which is affecting us passively. Thus, receptivity in the sense of a mere “I notice” presupposes a prior affection; that which is now brought into focus was already affecting and stimulating the subject unnoticed (Hua 11/64, 84).In order to explain the occurrence of reflection, however, it is necessary that that which is to be disclosed and thematized is (unthematically) present; otherwise, there would be nothing tomotivate and call forth the act of reflection. As Husserl pointed out, it is in the nature of reflection to grasp s...
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豆友10780532011-03-04Much misunderstanding might have been avoided if he had always distinguished as clearly between the two as he did in Ideen II, where he equated “inner perception” with reflection, and “inner consciousness” with a nonthematic kind of selfawareness that precedes reflection (Hua 4/118).
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豆友10780532011-03-04When I consciously perceive something, say, a drawing of Rembrandt, I am directed at and preoccupied with the drawing. Whenever I am consciously directed at the drawing, I am also self-aware, but I am not thematically conscious of myself. When I do thematize myself in reflection, the very act of thematization remains unthematic.
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Slothrop2012-02-28“一种令人满意的意识学说并不能仅仅依靠对意向行为的功能分析，而是应当重视意识的第一人称或主体之维”（p.5）
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昭歌山2018-01-08对交互主体性的探讨要求对主体性和世界之间的关联进行同步的分析。
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昭歌山2018-01-08“反思”是一个含义丰富的术语，因而我们必须区分不同类型的反思。一些形式的反思甚至可能具有自身异化的特点。它们涉及到对自己采用他者的视角。（1）作为叙事建构的自身，以及（2）作为体验维度的自身。
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昭歌山2018-01-08任何对于把意识还原到神经结构或将其自然化的可能性评估都要求一种对意识的体验方面的具体分析和描述。就像内格尔曾经指出的那样，针对任何有条理的还原主义，一项必然的要求在于那个被还原的实体已被完全理解了。
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昭歌山2018-01-08如果我们期望知道成为一个自身意味着什么，我们就必须考察体验和自身觉知的结构。
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马蹄北去2023-03-14一些患者能够比另一些更好地表达出这些细微的紊乱。帕纳斯的一个病人称，那种他的体验属于他自己的感受总伴随着一种瞬间的迟滞；另一名患者称他的自身仿佛莫名其妙地被向后移置了几公分。还有一位则称他感到有一种无法形容的内部变化阻止他去过正常的生活。他感到自己并不实际在场或甚至完全地活着，这一令人痛苦的感受困扰着他。这种疏远或分离体验伴随着一种观察或监控其内在世界的倾向。他将这种痛苦概述为，他的第一人称生命已经丧失了，并且被一种第三人称视角所取代（Parnas，2003，223）。