觉醒的泥足巨人

• 小飞侠3799

  2012-07-05
  26. increasing political fragmentation in India makes purposive governance moer difficult.27. Local government even at the county level has still a great deal of power in China more than in India in privatizing state companies, in regulatory approvals and patronage distribution, in appointing local oversight committees against financial and other irregularities, in appointment of (and fixing salaries of) judges and public prosecutors etc.
• 小飞侠3799

  2012-07-04
  1. More than 1.5 million Indian children die every year due to waterborne diseases such as diarrhea and dysentery.2. Dasgupta 2005: in India there is a strong capacity for dealding with (disease) outbreaks when they occur, but not to prevent them from occuring. Impressive capacity also exists for conducting intensive campaigns, but not for sustaining these gains on a continuing basis after the campaign. This is illustrated by the near-eradication of malaria through highly-organized efforts in the 1950s, and its resurgence when attention shifted to other priorities such as family planning.3. In reform period China essentially moved from one of the most impressive basic public-health coverage systems to in effect a privatized (or user-charge-financed) system, particularly in rural areas. M...
• 小飞侠3799

  2012-07-04
  1. Some disaggregated studies across districts in India have found trade liberalization actually slowing down the decline in rural poverty. Such results may indicate the difficulty of displaced farmers and workers in adjusting to new activities and sectors on account of various constraints (e.g.: in getting credit or information or infrastructural facilities such as power and roads, high incidence of school dropouts, and labor market rigidities), even when new opportunitis are opened up by globalization. This is in line with textbooks in international economics that emphasize that product market liberalization need not be an improvement when there are severe distortions in input markets (such as those of credit, labor, electricity land ect. in the case of India.)2. Borooah, Gustafsson, Sh...
• 小飞侠3799

  2012-07-04
  c.f. Private indigenous entrepreneurial model of Zhejiang v. state-led capitalism of Shanghai and Jiangsu (with a prominent role of foreign investment): Shanghai model result in little innovation, rapid but relatively jobless growth, low labor income share and high income inequality.
• 小飞侠3799

  2012-07-04
  6. BSE was a closed market, acting mainly in the interest of its members. c.f. NSE rapidly became the largest stock market in India and the 3rd largest in the world, measured by the no. of transactions.
• 小飞侠3799

  2012-07-04
  1. In both countries the spread of state-owned bank branches and post offices helped moblize rural saving. In China, rural household saving rates are much higher than the rates for urban households (possibly reflecting precautionary saving, as social protection is significantly better in the urban sector).2. Almost all of the investment in India is in fixed capital and the share of inventory investment is minimal. Private corporate sector of India accounts for less than 10% of GDP.3. Much depends on the internal managerial reforms in the banks, both private and public.4. Amount of total deposits per employee is nearly twice as much in private banks as in public banks. This contributes to the fact that India has one of the highest costs of financial intermediation in the world.5. In Chi...
• 小飞侠3799

  2012-07-04
  1. Power: Aggregate technical and commercial (ATC) losses (including theft and nonbilling) were about 37% in 2004-05 for the country as a whole (larger in some nothern Indian states).2. Highways: A major feature of financing NHDP (National Highway Development Project) in India was to move away form the usual practice of funding roads from general tax revenues, and instead to depend on a levy on fuel going into an earmarked Cnetral Road Fund. Nearly 2/3 of the funding of NHDP projects was from the fuel levy. In China, financing depends more on tolls than on a fuel levy.3. Railways: Operations are still highly centralized (unlike in highways and electricity, where there is more autonomy at the provincial and enterprise level) and not fully commercialized. In spite of some improvements in p...
• 小飞侠3799

  2012-07-04
  5. Large part of the growth in the service sector (at a rate higher than that in manufacturing) was in the traditional or "unorganized sector" services, which even in the past decade formed about 60% of the service-sector output. tiny enterprises. But small firms, while accounting for about 90% of manufacturing employment, contribute only about a third of total manufacturing output. 6. The institutional foundations of Chinese reform have taken the form of regional experimentation and regional competition. With a relatively low degree of interregional interdependence, it has been possible to isolate the impact if a regional experiment fails.7. Of the total government expenditure in China more than half is made at subprovincial levels, compared to only about 5% in India. Thus decentralizat...
• 小飞侠3799

  2012-07-04
  9. In infrastructure: policital exigencies and pressures of electoral populism in India keep user charges low, even blowing the state budget in the process, hampering investment incentives, and delaying the separation of government functions from commercial operations, a matter in which China has advanced much more...For many years now, infrastructure has been the key bottleneck in Indian economic growth.10. A heterogeneous society, riddled with social and economic inequalities and conflicts, makes collective action for lasting change difficult to organize and presents populist obstacles to long-term investment.