这次不一样：八百年金融危机史（珍藏版）

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  2012-04-09
  The transition from "emerging market" to "advanced economy" status does not come with diploma or a well-defined set of criteria to mark the upgrade. As Qian and Reinhart highlight, graduation can be defined as the attainment and subsequent mantainance of international investment-grade status; the emphasis here is on the maintenance part. Another way of decribing this criterion for graduation would be to say that the country has significantly and credibly reduced its chances of defaulting on its sovereign debt obligations. If it ever was a serial defaulter, it no longer is, and investors recognize it as such. Gaining access to capital markets is no longer a stop-and-go process. Graduation may also be defined as the achievement of some minimum threshold in terms of income per capita, a signi...
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  2012-04-09
  We should note that currency crashes tend to be more serious affairs when governments have been explicity or even implicitly fixing the exchange rate. Even an implicit guarantee of exchange rate stability can lull banks, corporation, and citizens into taking on heavy foreign currency liabilities, thinking there is a low risk of a sudden currency devaluation that will sharply increase the burden of carrying such loans. In a sense, the collapse of a currency is a collapse of a government guarantee on which the private sector might have relied, and therefore it constitutes a default on an important promise. Of course, large swings in exchange rates can also be traumatic for a country with a clear and explicit regime of floating exchange rates, especially if there are substantial levels of for...
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  2012-04-06
  How relevant are historical benchmarks in assessing the trajectory of a crisis such as the global financial crisis of the late 2000s, the Second Great Contraction? On the one hand, authorities now have arguably more flexible monetary policy frameworks, thanks particularly to a less rigid global exchange rate regime. And some central banks showed an aggressiveness early on by acting in a way that was notably absent in the 1930s or in the latter-day Japanese experience. On the other hand, we would be wise not to push too far the conceit that we are smarter than our predecessors. A few years back, many people would have said that improvements in financial engineering had done much to tame the business cycle and limit the risk of financial contagion.
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  2012-04-05
  Although there are well-known data issues involved in comparing unemployment rates across countries, the relatively poor performance in advanced countries suggests that possibility that greater wage flexibility in emerging markets may help cushion employment during periods of severe economic distress. The gaps in the social safety net in emerging market economies, compared to industrial ones, presumably also make workers more anxious to avoid becoming unemployed.Admittedly, as we noted earlier, for the post-World War II period, the declines in real GDP have been smaller for advanced economies than for emerging market economies. A probable explanation for the more severe contractions in emerging market economies is that they are prone to abrupt reversals in the availability of foreign cred...
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  2012-04-05
  Financial crises seldom occur in a vacuum. More often than not, financial crisis begins only after a real shock slows the pace of the economy; thus it serves as an amplifying mechanism rather than a trigger.
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  2012-04-05
  The U.S. conceit that its financial and regulatory system could withstand massive capital inflows on a sustained basis without any problems arguably laid the foundations of the global financial crisis of the late 2000s. The thinking that "this time is different" -- because this time U.S. had a superior system -- once again proved false. Outsized financial market returns were in fact greatly exaggerated by capital inflows, just as would be the case in emerging markets. What could in retrospect be recognized as huge regulatory mistakes, including the deregulation of the subprime mortgage market and the 2004 decision of the Securities and Exchange Commission to allow investment banks to triple their leverage ratios, appeared benign at the time. Capital inflows pushed up borrowing and asset pr...
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  2012-04-05
  As is well known, the U.S. financial crisis of the late 2000s was firmly rooted in the bubble in the real estate market fueled by sustained massive increase in housing prices, a massive influx of cheap foreign capital resulting from record trade balance and current account deficits, and an increasingly permissive regulatory policy that helped propel the dynamic between these factors.
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  2012-04-04
  Since the early 1970s, financial and international capital account liberalization -- reduction and removal of barriers to investment inside and outside a country -- have taken root worldwide. So, too, have banking crises. After a long hiatus, the share of countries with banking difficulties first began to expand in the 1970s. The break-up of the Bretton Woods system of fixed exchanged rates, together with a sharp spike in oil prices, catalyzed a prolonged global recession, resulting in financial sector difficulties in a number of advanced economies. In the early 1980s, a collapse in global commodity prices, combined with high and volatile interest rates in the United States, contributed to a spate of banking and sovereign debt crises in emerging economies, most famously Latin America and t...
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  2012-04-04
  Thus, although many now-advanced economies have graduated from a history of serial default on sovereign debt or very high inflation, so far graduation from banking crises has proven elusive. Indeed, despite dramatic differences in recent sovereign default performance, the incidence of banking crises is about the same for advanced economies as for emerging markets. It also should be noted that as financial markets have developed in the smaller, poorer economies, the frequency of banking crises has increased.
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  2012-04-03
  Remarkably, however, despite the trauma the country experienced in the wake of the French Revolution and the Napoleonic Wars, France eventually managed to emerge from its status as a serial defaulter. France did not default in the nineteenth or twentieth century, nor has it in the twenty-first century. Therefore, France may be considered among the first countries to "graduate" from serial default.
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  2019-04-28
  1. 对于重大历史事件的判断，最需要的元素是：时间。2. 充实的定量和经验分析。3. 在充满不确定性的世界中寻找确定性，在周而复始的变化中寻找恒常，在历史的多棱镜中探求规律，最可依赖的工具是数字。4. 作者将危机的一再发生归结为人性。5. 研究危机旨在为避免危机提供参考。6. 历史不会重复自己，但会压着同样的韵脚。
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  2019-04-28
  译者序 前言 致谢 绪论 第一部分 金融危机入门 第1章　危机的类型和标识2 第2章　债务不耐：连续违约的根源16 第3章　一个基于长期视角的全球金融危机数据库27 第二部分 主权外债危机 第4章　债务危机的理论基础40 第5章　外债主权违约的周期53 第6章　历史上的外债违约68 第三部分 被遗忘的国内债务与违约史 第7章　国内债务和违约的程式化事实82 第8章　国内债务：解释外债违约和严重通货膨胀缺失的一环94 第9章　国内债务违约和外债违约：谁更严重，谁更重要102 第四部分 银行危机、通货膨胀和货币危机 第10章　银行危机112 第11章　通过货币减值的违约：“旧世界”的偏爱137 第12章　通货膨胀与现代货币危机142 第五部分 美国次贷危机和第二次大紧缩 第13章　美国次贷危机：一个跨国的历史比较分析159 第14章　金融危机的后果174 第15章　次贷危机的国际视角：是危机传染还是共同因素冲击187 第16章　金融危机的综合度量193 第六部分 我们从中学到了什么 第17章　关于早期预警、国家升级、政策应对及人性弱点 的思考216 数据附录228 参考文献289
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  2019-04-28
  1. 卡门 M. 莱因哈特（Carmen M. Reinhart）马里兰大学经济学教授。与人共同主编了《21世纪首次全球金融危机》一书，经常为国际货币基金组织和世界银行授课。2. 肯尼斯•罗格夫（Kenneth S. Rogoff）哈佛大学经济学教授、Thomas D. Cabot公共政策教授。《国际宏观经济学基础》的作者之一，美国国家公共广播、《华尔街日报》和《金融时报》特约评论员。
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  2019-04-28
  两位著名经济学家经过深入的研究、严谨的分析，指出历史上金融危机发生的频率、持续的时间和影响程度都惊人的相似。历史可以给研究金融危机的人提供许多经验，本书揭示了几百年间金融的跌宕起伏规律，会在相当长的时间内影响政策的讨论和制定，注定会成为一本重要的书。本书涵盖了全球66个国家和地区800多年的国际金融危机历史，从中世纪的货币流通问题，到今天的次贷危机。作者运用丰富的数据，通过详尽而深入的分析，揭示了几百年间金融的跌宕起伏规律，会在相当长的时间内影响政策的讨论和制定，是金融和经济研究者应读的一本重要书籍。
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  2012-04-04
  Two features stand out from the summary statistics presented in table. First is the persistence of the cycle in real housing prices in both advanced economies and emerging markets, typically for four to six years. The second feature that stands out from table is that the magnitudes of the declines in real housing prices around banking crises from peak to trough are not appreciably different in emerging and advanced economie. This comparability is quite surprising given that most macroeconomic time series exhibit drastically greater volatility in emerging markets; therefore, it merits further attention. Certainly the first results presented here from comparisons of housing price booms and busts around the dates of banking crises appears to provide strong support for the contention that bank...
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  2012-04-03
  In sum, economists can find arguments to explain why countries are able to borrow abroad despite the limited rights of creditors. But the arguments are surprisingly complex, suggesting that sustainable debt levels may be fragile as well. Concerns over future access to capital markets, maintaining trade, and possibly broader international relations all support debt flows, with the relative emphasis and weights depending on factors specific to each situation. That is, even if lenders cannot directly go in and seize assets as in a conventional domestic default, they still retain leverage sufficient to entice a country to repay loans of at least modest size. We can dismiss, however, the popular notion that countries pay back their debts so that they can borrow even more in the future. Ponzi sc...